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2 February 1959

Copy No. C 63

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 15  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X  
DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: 15-9-0  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: 1-4-80  
DATE: 1-4-80 REVIEWER:

State Dept. review completed

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2 February 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*no* **USSR:** The Soviet leaders will probably resume their attack on the antiparty group when the party congress reconvenes on 2 February after a one-day recess. It is still not clear whether the congress will take any further action against the members of the group. Two former top leaders, **M. G. Pervukhin** and **M. Z. Saburov**, first linked publicly with the group on 29 January, have not since been mentioned in this connection, but Pervukhin, Soviet ambassador to East Germany, has apparently been removed as a candidate member of the party presidium.

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*no* **Iran-USSR:** (The Shah on 30 January confirmed that he was seeking to conclude a nonaggression pact with the USSR; negotiations with the Soviet officials who had come to Tehran were continuing. He insisted that he must do this to secure a respite from Soviet pressure and stressed the inadequacy of American military and budgetary aid. The Shah gave no indications that he was prepared to reconsider his decision. Meanwhile on 31 January an Iranian Foreign Ministry official appealed to a US Embassy official to provide him with indications of American willingness to supply more aid with the hope of inducing the Shah to change his mind.)

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*ok* Pakistan: Release of the final communiqué of the Baghdad Pact meetings has occasioned a bitterly critical outburst in the Karachi press. It voiced deep resentment over American unwillingness to guarantee Pakistan against aggression from any quarter. Several papers, noting the "benefits" accruing to neutralist countries, called for a reappraisal of Karachi's foreign policy. While the press may not precisely express the government's view, President Ayub probably is willing to use such criticism in the controlled press to increase pressure on the US to make stronger commitments to Pakistan in defense arrangements.

## III. THE WEST



no Italy: The resignation of Amintore Fanfani as secretary general of the Christian Democratic party on 31 January, following his resignation as premier last week, further indicates the complexity of the Italian Government crisis and suggests an extensive struggle before formation of a new government or recourse to national elections. Fanfani probably feels that the Christian Democrats will eventually be forced to turn back to him to solve the problem.

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no Argentina: The Communists and some Peronista labor leaders are reported planning hostile demonstrations against President Frondizi on his 3 February return from his visit to the United States. The Communists probably see this as an unusual opportunity to try to promote their priority objective of weakening American influence. The police plan strong security measures.

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


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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No Back-up Material

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Shah of Iran Seeking Earliest Possible Nonaggression  
Pact With USSR

[The Shah of Iran said on 30 January that he wants to conclude a nonaggression pact with the USSR as quickly as possible. He said that in the absence of what he considers adequate US aid and guarantees against invasion, he had initiated negotiations with the USSR in order to gain a respite from Soviet pressure. According to the terms of the Iranian proposal as outlined by the Shah, Iran will guarantee not to sign the pending bilateral treaty with the United States. In exchange, it will ask that the new pact with the USSR not modify the 1921 and 1927 treaties but complement them in the light of changed conditions since their conclusion.]

[If the Iranians conclude a pact barring the pending bilateral agreement with the United States, this will have serious effects on Pakistan, which appears not to be aware of how far the Shah has gone in the direction of a pact with the USSR.]

[The Shah seems to have rationalized all objections to a nonaggression pact and had a ready answer for all counter arguments presented by a US official. He apparently has convinced himself that depositing a nonaggression pact with the UN will exert moral pressure on the USSR to honor the treaty.]

[The Shah's new course appears to have been influenced by his belief that Iran is being treated less favorably than other US allies such as Turkey. He placed great stress on US unwillingness to supply missiles and train Iranian officers to use them, remarking that Iranian officers are not donkeys, incapable of learning.]

[Amir Khosro Afshar-Qasemlu, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, also stressed the Shah's disappointment over missiles and training in a meeting with Counselor Wilkins on 31 January. Afshar sought assurances of further US aid in the hope]

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(Of using them to influence the Shah toward a course of continuing cooperation with the US.)

(On 31 January an Iranian senator complained that Iran received less US aid than neutralist countries. This appears to be the start of an effort by the government to prepare the public for the negotiations now going on.)

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Pakistani Press Criticizes US and Baghdad Pact

The final communiqué of the Baghdad Pact meetings in Karachi has been used by the Pakistani press as a peg for an especially bitter attack on American policy toward Pakistan and on the effectiveness of the pact. While critical comment has increased in recent weeks as differences between Washington and Karachi over the proposed bilateral defense agreement have become known, the current outburst is the most unrestrained criticism of Pakistan's pro-Western orientation since Ayub's military regime took over on 27 October.

Several papers, recommending the "benefits" of a neutralist course, called for a reassessment of Pakistan's foreign policy. In addition to expressing deep disappointment with the progress of the Baghdad Pact, the editorials criticized the United States for its refusal to guarantee Pakistan against aggression from non-Communist as well as Communist sources. Particular stress was placed on charges that US officials had announced a willingness to defend India against aggression from Pakistan but had refused a similar commitment to its ally.

The demand for a reorientation of foreign policy probably does not precisely reflect the views of Ayub's government. Its failure to restrain the controlled press, however, suggests that Ayub hopes to increase pressure on the US to commit itself more firmly to the defense of the Baghdad Pact countries.

Ayub may also feel that continued popular support for his government requires acknowledgment that the majority of the Pakistani public favors a more independent foreign policy. Karachi's recent effort to improve relations with Cairo apparently is an attempt to associate the government more closely with support of Arab nationalism.

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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004300350001-5

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